How Effective is Congress as a Legislature?

How Effective is relative as a Legislature?Among the macrocosms most in(predicate) democracies is the United States, whose system of checks and balances has seen more triumphes than failures. A system constantly in flux, the American form of government is divided into legislative, judicial, and decision maker branches. Of these branches, perhaps the one whose aptitude is most challenged is the carnal knowledge, the just now branch directly representing the interests of the people (the judiciary is appointed by the executive, which in turn is selected by an electoral college comprised of the legislative). Recent developments in the world stage, in addition to the changing face of American politics and domestic interests have tested the bounds of congress as well as its ability to function as a check against the executive. Most glaring of its purported shortcomings, however, is its legislative powers. Todays Congress is most impeded by partisan agendas, tralatitious bureaucr acies, and conflicts of personal interest in its daily machinations. No matter its inefficacies, however, it cannot be argued that there is a permanent or necessary connection amongst good example assemblies and liberty1. In an unusual political paradox, it is Congress existence despite its countless failures as a legislature that makes it a successful legislative body, and in doing so, makes the United States a successful democracy.As a bicameral entity, Congress is utile in balancing partisan interests with voter interest. Following serious iron out after the 1994 GOP blitzkrieg spearheaded by Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia), the two legislative bodies continued down their own respective paths. As they adjusted to GOP reforms, the two chambers took different paths and by the late 1980s power in the House had centralized under a stronger majority party leadership, whereas the Senate continued as a highly individualistic chamber2. Pursuing an amalgamation of partisan as well as regi onal percentage interests, the Congress is currently highly good as a exercise legislative body. Recent evidence of partisan splits manifested themselves in the Dubai Ports World fallout and the clash over President Bushs knob Worker Program, in which Republican interests revealed the separation earlier delineated. Even in seemingly atomic number 53-party administrations such as the current Bush administration find themselves in check, its constituents conflicted over interests of the people and goals of the party. The White House has encountered responses varying from wholesale rejection such as Dana Rohrabachers (R-California) of the Guest Worker Program to Peter Kings (R-New York) attempted compromise of the failed Dubai Ports Deal initiative.In the sense of sustaining the esteemed tradition of checks and balances, the Congress has proven itself as successful in comparison to the state of congressional affairs in the 1950s, when the largely ineffective House and Senate were commonly char encountererized as rigid feudal systems ruled by a small number of regnant committee barons today, they are more often depicted as anarchies where members participated on their own terms and without restraint owed to executive partisan allegiance3. It can be effectively argued, however, that the phenomenon of single party conflict is primarily reactionary in nature, a statement that reflects detractors sentiments that congressional formula is effective only when there is time to accommodate the bureaucratic machinations that are both Congressional hallmarks and weaknesses. In defense of the American Congress, however, the like ineffectual tendencies can be said of any representative law-making body. All representative assemblies such as Congress are ineffectual and inherently unfit to be primary political institutions in a technological mass-age that commands urgency Congress is regarded by around to be legislatively anomalous not only in their inescapable defects as political institutions but also in their characteristic virtues4. Domestic principle may not require urgency or the consolidation of a rushed majority, but in an increasingly globalized environment, the individual temerity and trivial maneuvers of constituent consolidation render Congress alarmingly impotent as a body politic. In his On the Hill a History of the American Congress, Alvin Josephy asserts that the same Congressional bureaucracy that maintains its plebiscitary nature hampers jurisprudence and periodi abusey angers taxpayers, further eroding the prestige of the legislature and served to stultify Congress by deadening its vitality and hostility amid the enervating trappings of a privileged bureaucracy5.Some scholars purport that to date, the American Congress, though fallen, is not dead6. However, in drastic times that call for speedy resolution, the American government has reconciled itself to the removal of its bureaucracy in the nullification of Congressional wor kings. The War Powers occlusion, though designed to limit the Presidents power to wage state of war without Congressional approval, is still bounded by the simple fact that Congress is removed from the equation. There would be no declare oneself for such an act if Congress established itself as decisive or effective in its legislation. Congressional efficacy has eroded over the last foursome administrations, stumbling over its own feet in the establishment of a requisite two-thirds majority in order to reign in the executive branch. Despite recent demonstrations of power, the congressional curb on the executive has been potential, for the most part, in recent years, its capabilities seldom directly or wisely applied7. Conditional clauses such as those of the War Powers response are designed to render the Congress as powerless as possible even the 60-day statute of limitation binding the duration of the War Powers Resolution are contingent upon a time the President deems fit. Gr anted, more moderate alternatives exist, and past attempts were made to remedy the mounting problem of bureaucratic functional delays. separatist committees were created to handle different fields in legislation. For example, current congressional committees include the committees on foreign relations, security, and military appropriations exist. The number of committees is limited so as to quicken decisive action. Unfortunately, attempts such as the limiting of committees to abate the morays of bureaucratic management came to nothing when both houses began to create numerous subcommittees and special committees the goal of helping members of Congress in their work was corrupted by an unprecedented expansion of questionable emoluments and perquisites for Senators and Representatives sic8. Further divisive in their truncation, Congress proved vastly ineffective as a legislative body, most notably due to a loss of functional perspective. The mentioned committees, subcommittees and s pecial committees serve as little more than mediocre shows of power. For example, a minority Democrat Congress may propose several subcommittees so as to facilitate a platform for display of legislative efficacy. If, for example, several smaller committees exist, their individual victories would provide more substantial political capital and momentum so as to provide for a future Democrat Congress. The current in-migration reform failures of the Bush administration exemplify the type of fertile political ground established by smaller victories. Larger issues such as the war in Iraq and the treatment of so-called enemy combatants in the current War on Terror that would erstwhile cost Congressional credibility are overshadowed by the successes of smaller committees, whose numerous victories debase presidential and GOP reliability in the eyes of the taxpayer (and more importantly, the swing constituents that won a Republican Congress in 1994). policy-making aspirations are thinly vei led by legislative action in Congress, which has yet to strongly assert itself in pressing issues of the current administration.There is no doubting the necessity of Congress, no matter its shortcomings. As part of the advance of democratism in belief and practice, a plebiscitary or numerical majority comes to seem the only proper expression of the sovereign general will9. No matter the inefficacy of Congress as a legislature, its existence as a legislative body is the prerogative of the people who formed it. Politically speaking, Congress is little more than a forum used to trumpet partisan goals and achievements. The struggle between the two-party American political systems is, however, manifested in legislative wins and losses, no matter how nominal. It is in this mode that Congress is effectiveAmerican Congress is effective as a farcical stage in which political dominance is procured through a series of legislative initiatives. Congress devolution as a legislature seems to be co rrelated with a more general historical transformation toward political and social forms within which the representative assemblythe major political being of post-Renaissance western civilizationdoes not have a primary political function10. Essentially, if legislation is meant to hasten the workings of a democracy, Congress is impotent as a legislative body. However, if the success of Congressional legislation is measured in its ability to marginalize partisan interests, then Congress is not only effective but the most necessary tool in a representative body. Today, Congress relegation to a reactionary bureaucracy renders it a rubber stamp, a name and a ritual, or an echo of powers lodged elsewhere11. The bicameral legislature, then, is merely a formality, and if treated as such, is a success and for the most part an effective system. Its bureaucratic democratism is in such a mode an indispensable instrument of its managerial rule the goal, therefore, is not to pass legislation, bu t to expose the choices and leanings of those involved in decision-making so as to better acquaint respective constituents with their selections in future elections12. The more obtuse failures of the United States Congress have been those that occur in the nutrition of equal distribution of governance among the branches of government. The legislature has oft been expressed as a puppet of the executive, unwilling to abolish any of the important newer agencies, bureaus or programs of the executive branch but by reasserting the power of the purse it still might do so, and this the bureaucracy must keep, however scornfully and reluctantly, in mind13. In its reactionary state, Congress is rather successful as a legislature, albeit lacking in initiative and any means of preventative measures. Congress legislative powers clothe it with the constantly renewed ability to inform citizens about the conduct of the bureaucracy, no matter how closely the executive guards said information14.Some indeed argue that Congress would be more effective as a political appendage of the executive which, after a certain amount of verbal ritual, and without genuine debate, eer and predictably approved the executives proposals by a unanimous or close to unanimous vote15. However effective this would render the act of legislation, it would cease to be democratic and hence become decree. The act of legislation is, in and of itself, defined by bureaucratic inefficacy. What most key out to as bureaucracy, others refer to as consensus.Congress failures and glaring inefficiencies are its only measure of success the more unanimous (or what is perceived to be unanimity) the action, the less evidence exists of any echt debate or public consultation.The Truman administration, for example, was an instance in which Congress legislative efficiency revealed little more than a diminished democracy led by pandering to executive governance. The lack of real legislation during the Cold War was not in the failure to change, but the failure to pass any sort of legislation in Congress that would curb a) hawkish defense spending, and b) presidential liberties in unilateral action.It is indisputable that Congressional powers have diminished, but the diminution of Congressional efficacy reflects its success as a legislature. Bureaucratic bodies such as Congress exist to hamper decision-making, as slowing the process prevents autocracy. If measuring the ability of Congressional legislation is an evaluation of its polity and ability to effectively maneuver without fear of retribution or disagreement, then Congress is a complete and utter failure. However, if the success of Congressional legislature is measured by the amount of bureaucratic stalling and arguments between parties vying for dominance that can never truly exist, then the stasis created would render erstwhile legislative failings as hallmarks of democratic success.BIBLIOGRAPHYBurnham, James. (1965) Congress and the American Tradition. Chicago Henry RegneryCompany.Josephy, Alvin M. (1975) On the Hill A History of the American Congress. New YorkMcGraw-Hill, Inc.Zelizer, Julian E. (2004) The American Congress The Building of a Democracy. BostonHoughton-Mifflin Trade and Reference.Footnotes1 Burnham 3382 Zelizer 6253 Zelizer 6254 Burnham 3455 Josephy 3696 Burnham 3377 Burnham 3398 Josephy 3699 Burnham 33410 Ibid11 Burnham 33712 Burnham 33813 Burnham 33914 Burnham 40015 Burnham 341